Section summary
Of 16,166 money requests filed in both chambers over ten years, 12,719 were concentrated on one place, facility or organization and 3,447 were diffuse. At the same size, the Senate adopted concentrated requests somewhat more often (odds ratio 1.40), almost all of it in requests under $250,000. The larger tilt runs through size: 38% of diffuse requests were $1 million or more, against 6% of concentrated requests, and in FY2025 and FY2026 the Senate adopted none of 39 diffuse requests of $10 million or more.
A concentrated request benefits one place, facility or organization. A diffuse request benefits everyone who qualifies, statewide. Of 16,166 money requests filed in both chambers over ten years, 12,719 were concentrated and 3,447 diffuse.
At the same size, the Senate adopted concentrated requests somewhat more often: an odds ratio of 1.40, about seven percentage points. Almost all of that edge is in small requests: 27 points under $50,000 and 20 points between $50,000 and $250,000. Above $250,000 there is no difference. By the final enacted budget, earmark requests of the two kinds written the same way fared alike. The effect also loses significance if statewide organizations are counted as diffuse.
The larger tilt runs through size. Diffuse benefits are spread across everyone, so they come in large numbers. The median diffuse request in the Senate was $500,000; the median concentrated request, $80,000. Thirty-eight percent of diffuse requests were $1 million or more, against 6% of concentrated requests. In FY2025 and FY2026 the Senate adopted none of 39 diffuse requests of $10 million or more. No single vote has to favor a place over a program for the totals to come out that way.
Within the FY2024–FY2026 need-based amendments the gap is widest. The Senate adopted concentrated need-based requests about half the time and diffuse ones 10% to 14% of the time, a gap that holds at equal size (odds ratio 3.7). The food pantry passes; the benefit increase waits.
The executive branch runs the other way. In both recorded mid-year cuts, governors cut a larger share of concentrated line dollars than program dollars: 2.2% against 0.25% in December 2016, and 1.3% against 0.34% in January 2024 (0.86% counting the MassHealth fee-for-service cut). The Legislature restores concentrated lines more reliably after vetoes, though most of that gap comes from cuts to sheriffs, prosecutors and agency administration that it chose to let stand.
The fair conclusion is modest. Places do have an edge at equal size, but it is small, and it lives in small requests. The structural result is that diffuse needs arrive in sizes the budget process rarely approves.